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This paper studies the e⁄ects of distortionary taxes and public in-
vestment in an endogenous growth OLG model with knowledge trans-
mission. Fiscal policy a⁄ects growth in two respects: ￿rst, work time
reacts to variations of prospective tax rates and modi￿es knowledge
formation; second, public spending enhances labour e¢ ciency but also
stimulates physical capital through increased savings. It is shown that
Ramsey-optimal policies reduce savings due to high tax rates on young
generations, and are not necessarily growth-improving with respect to
a pure private system. Non-Ramsey policies that shift the burden on
adults are always growth-improving due to crowding-in e⁄ects: the
welfare of all generations is unambiguously higher with respect to a
private system, and there generally exists a continuum of non-optimal
tax rates under which long-run growth and welfare are higher than
with the Ramsey-optimal policy.
JEL classi￿cation: E62, O41, O11.
Keywords: Endogenous growth, Human capital, Overlapping generations,
Tax policy, Public investment.
￿Institute of Economic Research, ETH Zurich. Address: Zurichbergstrasse 18 - ZUE
F15, CH-8032 Zurich (Switzerland). E-mail: svalente@ethz.ch.
11 Introduction1
After Lucas￿(1988) seminal contribution, the view that human capital for-
mation drives economic development inspired a huge body of literature on
endogenous growth. Several authors investigated the sources of knowledge
accumulation at both the theoretical and empirical levels, emphasising the
role of educational attainment and knowledge spillovers in raising aggregate
productivity (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994). Empirical evidence suggests that
monetary investments in education, and public spending in particular, are
also relevant in determining the accumulation rate of human capital (Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).2 However, the link between taxation, public invest-
ment in education, and knowledge transmission, has not been fully analysed
at the theoretical level. Several recent studies analyse the growth e⁄ects of
taxation in Lucas-type settings with overlapping generations, where knowl-
edge transmission determines an intergenerational externality. This litera-
ture typically assumes that study time a⁄ects knowledge through a learning
process: given a ￿nite amount of time to be allocated between studying and
working, individual choices determine a tradeo⁄ between human and physi-
cal capital accumulation at the aggregate level (see e.g. De Gregorio, 1996;
Yakita, 2003). In fact, some recent contributions also include educational
expenditures in the learning process, and analyse the long-run e⁄ects of al-
ternative policies by means of simulations using computable general equilib-
rium models (Docquier and Michel, 1999; Hendricks, 1999; Bouzahzah et al.,
2002). However, most analytical results on the growth e⁄ects of taxation rule
out productive educational expenditures: Bovenberg and van Ewijk (1997),
Meijdam (1998), Heijdra and Ligthart (2000), and Yakita (2003) examine
long-run distortions induced by taxing capital and labour incomes without
assuming labour-enhancing monetary investment.3
This paper studies the e⁄ects of alternative tax policies when both study
1I thank CentER, Tilburg University, and CeFiMS, University of London, for hospital-
ity, and Barbara Annicchiarico, Fabrizio Adriani, Christa Brunnschweiler, Luca Deidda,
Giancarlo Marini, Pasquale Scaramozzino, Sjak Smulders, and three anonymous Referees
for comments and suggestions. Financial support from the European Commision - Marie
Curie Fellowship - is gratefully acknowledged.
2According to the cross-country analysis by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Chap.13),
a 1.5 percent increase in the public education spending-GDP ratio would have raised the
average growth rate by 0.3 percent per year in the period 1965-1975.
3An exception is Buiter and Kletzer (1995): the authors study the e⁄ects of borrowing
constraints when private and public spending in education are perfect substitutes.
2time and educational expenditure improve human capital formation. In this
setting, ￿scal policy in￿ uences long-run growth through two channels: (i) the
reallocation of time between studying and working induced by variations of
prospective tax rates, and (ii) the link between educational spending, private
savings and knowledge accumulation. With respect to Bovenberg and van
Ewijk (1997), Meijdam (1998), and Yakita (2003), mechanism (ii) is pecu-
liar to this model, since public spending may imply substantial crowding-in
e⁄ects. It is shown that these two mechanisms imply an inverted-U relation
between long-run growth and the second-period tax rate. The reason for this
result is that the amount of study time and the asymptotic savings rate react
in opposite ways to balanced variations of tax rates: taxing young individ-
uals increases study time but lowers savings by reducing disposable income;
conversely, taxing adults boosts physical capital accumulation. The impli-
cation of the inverted-U relation is that any growth rate (except the unique
maximum level) is associated with opposite ￿nancing strategies: ￿ taxing the
young￿or ￿ taxing adults￿ .
Building on this result, we analyse alternative tax policies and discuss
their implications in terms of growth, welfare and intergenerational equity.
The typical starting point is to characterise Ramsey-optimal policies, i.e.
policies that implement the intertemporal allocation which maximises social
welfare, according to the standard utilitarian social welfare function. It is
shown that Ramsey-optimal policies imply high taxation in the ￿rst period
of life, and may be growth-improving with respect to a pure private system
depending on parameter values. A crucial role is played by the relative share
of physical capital in production: high tax rates on young generations reduce
savings, implying higher (lower) growth rates and welfare levels in the long
run if crowding-out e⁄ects are weak (strong) enough.
Considering alternative tax rules, it is shown that crowding-in e⁄ects
are important when the government pursues the opposite ￿nancing strategy,
i.e. ￿ taxing adults￿ : shifting the burden from the ￿rst to the second period
of life allows sustaining growth and welfare through increased savings. In
particular, tax rates may be adjusted so that work time of young agents is
the same as without public intervention: under this labour-neutral policy,
growth and welfare are always higher with respect to a pure private system,
irrespective of the parameter values. As a consequence, labour-neutral poli-
cies may increase long-run growth and preserve welfare of later generations
when compared with Ramsey-optimal policies.
Furthermore, the inverted-U relation between growth and second-period
3tax rates allows us to characterise a growth-equivalent policy under which the
asymptotic growth rate equals that obtained under Ramsey-optimal taxation.
This implies that there generally exists a set of policies yielding higher growth
and increased saving rates in the long run than those observed under Ramsey-
optimal taxation.
2 The model
The analysis employs an overlapping-generations model where human capital
accumulation is enhanced by monetary investment in education. In order to
assess the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy more neatly, the dynamic path experienced
in a pure public regime - where education is entirely ￿nanced by the gov-
ernment - is compared with that obtained in a pure private regime, where
young individuals pay their own education costs. Although the analysis is
connected with the literature on growth and education ￿nancing (Glomm and
Ravikumar, 1992; Eckstein and Zilcha, 1994; De Gregorio and Kim, 2000),
the aim of this paper is not to discuss the desirability of a particular school
system, but rather to describe the intergenerational consequences of alter-
native ￿nancing strategies within the public regime: the private system will
be thought of as a comparable benchmark economy, by means of which the
implications of di⁄erent tax rules for growth and welfare can be discussed.
Consider two economies indexed by i = A, B, with identical technolo-
gies, preferences, initial endowments, and a constant population of consumer-
workers who live for two periods. In period t there are n young and n adult
individuals, and each young individual inherits own knowledge from the cur-
rent state of the economy. Knowledge is represented by ￿ hi, measured in
terms of labour-e¢ ciency units. Individuals are endowed with one unit of
time: in the ￿rst period of life a fraction (1￿‘i
t) is devoted to study, and ‘i
t￿ hi
t
labour units are supplied for production. In the second period, individuals
only work, and consume all their income.4 The level of e¢ ciency achieved at
the beginning of the second period of life depends on study time and school
4A relevant issue not addressed in this paper is the interplay between education ￿nanc-
ing and pension funding, which would require including a third period of life in which
agents only consume. While a three-period version would require numerical solutions, the
basic two-period setup employed here allows to obtain analytical results on crowding-in
e⁄ects, ￿lling the gap in previous literature. Extending the model to include pensions is
nonetheless an interesting topic which deserves further research.
4quality Ei, according to the learning technology
￿ h
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￿￿ ; i = A;B; (2)
where ￿ > 0 is a proportionality factor, ’ exhibits decreasing returns in
both arguments (0 < " < 1, 0 < ￿ < 1) and non-increasing returns to scale
(" + ￿ ￿ 1). Aggregate human capital H is the amount of labour supplied
by the two generations alive in period t: denoting by hi
t = n￿ hi
t the aggregate
amount of knowledge in each generation, human capital at time t equals
Hi
t = (1 + ‘i
t)hi




























Aggregate output (Y ) is produced by means of human and physical capital
(K) according to the production function Y = K￿H1￿￿, with 0 < ￿ < 1.
Physical capital fully depreciates during the production process. This widely-
used assumption is relevant for the analysis: on the one hand, assuming
one-period depreciation of K is reasonable in the present model - since a
￿ period￿corresponds to one half of the individual life cycle - and it allows us
to study dynamics analytically; on the other hand, the asymmetric treatment
of physical and human capital does not necessarily weaken the main results -
namely, Propositions 4 and 6 below - since assuming durable physical capital
might emphasise the role of crowding-in e⁄ects in the long run.









The production sector behaves like a single competitive ￿rm: denoting by w




















￿￿ ; i = A;B; (6)
Individual consumption is denoted by c when young, and by d when adult.
















5where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the private discount factor.
School quality is indexed by the levels of private and public spending in
education, which are assumed to be equally productive. Economy A is a
pure private system where education costs V are paid by young generations
and there is no public intervention: setting v = V=h, school quality equals
EA
t = vt. Economy B is a pure public school system with total spending in
education G ￿nanced through distortionary taxation: setting g = G=h yields
EB
t = gt. In the present context, assuming that private and public spending
are equally productive is formally equivalent to considering two extreme cases
of the general learning technology ’ = ￿(1 ￿ ‘)
" (v + g)
￿, which represents
a mixed school system with v and g as perfect substitutes.5
Firstly, consider the temporary equilibrium in the private system. In























































Denote aggregate savings by St = nst and set SA
t ￿ KA
t+1. Substituting
equilibrium prices (5)-(6) and the ￿rst-order conditions in individual budget



















The optimal amount of work time supplied by young generations determines,
together with (13), the temporary equilibrium of the economy, which is de-
5Assuming that v and g are equally productive is not particularly restrictive here. Since
we analyse alternative public policies using the private system as a comparable benchmark
economy, ruling out perfect substitutability would "[...] create a role for government in
human capital formation that is too straightforward" because it "would add to the algebra
without qualitatively changing the e⁄ects of public spending on human capital formation
and private ￿nancial saving" (Buiter and Kletzer, 1995, p.S168; our italics).
6￿ned at given expectations over the future interest rate and the future em-
ployment level. When there is a tradeo⁄ between studying and working,
it is possible to obtain stationary solutions, where work time jumps at the
equilibrium level ‘? in period zero and is constant thereafter (De Gregorio,
1996; de la Croix and Michel, 2002). In our model, the assumed learning
technology (2) implies a stationary solution (all proofs are in the Appendix):
Lemma 1 In the private education regime, work time supplied by young gen-
erations is equal to the optimal level ‘A



















1 + ￿" + ￿￿
: (15)
Coe¢ cients qA > 0 and pA > 1 in eq.(14) are constant parameters, and
the lower bound ‘A
min is the minimum amount of work time compatible with
positive savings - see eq.(13). Denoting the private propensity to spend in
education as ￿A
t = (vt=yA

















Hence, the optimal propensity is time-invariant, and the accumulation rule






















? (1 + ￿￿ + ￿") ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿
￿
"(1 + ￿)(1 + ‘A




Since ￿(1 ￿ ￿) < 1, the physical-human capital ratio converges to a steady-
state level in the long run.
In the public regime (economy B), the government imposes proportional






















t+1 (1 ￿ ￿t+1); (20)
7where x and ￿ are proportional tax rates on labour earnings in the ￿rst and
in the second period of life, respectively.6 The government keeps a balanced














Individuals anticipate tax rates with perfect foresight and maximise UB
t sub-
ject to (19)-(20) using cB
t ;dB
t ; and ‘B


















Since there is no public debt, net investment equals aggregate savings and



































t+1 = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿￿)
￿1 (1 ￿ ￿t+1); (26)
p
B
t+1 = 1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿￿)
￿1 (1 ￿ ￿t+1): (27)
Expressions (25)-(26)-(27) show that ‘B depends on prospective tax rates.
In particular, when ￿t is kept constant, public regimes also exhibit stationary
work time:
6On the one hand, allowing tax rates to di⁄er between generations ensures that the
Ramsey-optimal allocation can be implemented through instruments x, ￿ and ￿ as shown
in section 3.1. On the other hand, x and ￿ may be interpreted in terms of net marginal
burdens without loss of generality: this re￿ ects the possibility for the government to
implement age-uniform ￿ at tax rates on income together with public policies that modify
ex-post ￿scal wedges. These intergenerational distortions arise, for example, when the
government combines income taxes with subsidies ￿ la Docquier and Michel (1999), i.e.
monetary subsidies that relieve the opportunity cost of studying when young agents seek
higher education and/or skill-enhancing training.
8Lemma 2 If ￿t = ￿ in each period, work time of young generations in the
public regime equals ‘B





















When both tax rates are time-invariant, the economy converges to the
balanced growth path: denoting the public propensity to spend in education
by ￿B
t = (gt=yB
t ) and setting xt = x and ￿t = ￿ in the government budget




















(1 + ￿") ￿ ‘B
? (￿) ￿ 1
￿
(1 ￿ x)
"(1 + ￿)(1 + ‘B




In the public regime, the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy crucially depend on how
second-period tax rates modify the intersectoral allocation of time between
studying and working for young agents. These time-reallocation e⁄ects can
be described by considering ‘B
? as a function of ￿, which yields the following
results
Proposition 3 Work time ‘B
? depends on ￿ with the following properties:
i. @
@￿‘B
? (￿) > 0; lim￿!1 ‘B
? (￿) = 1; lim￿!￿1 ‘B
? (￿) = ‘B
min;






iii. ￿ ￿ > 0;
iv. ‘B
? (0) < ‘A
? :
Property (i) is intuitive: lowering second-period tax rates induces young
agents to study more and devote less time to work; heavily taxing adults
forces individuals to work in the ￿rst period of life, in order to accumulate
savings and rely on capital income in the second period. Symmetrically,
subsidising adult generations reduces work time, bringing ‘B
? towards the
lower bound. Properties (ii)-(iii) de￿ne a critical tax rate: setting ￿t = ￿ ￿ in
each period, work time is the same in the two regimes. We will refer to ￿ ￿ as
9the labour-neutral tax rate, which is strictly positive by (iii). Property (iv)
establishes that setting ￿t = 0 implies lower work time in the public school
regime.7
From (17) and (30), the physical-human capital ratio and the output-




































































Equation (35) shows that ￿scal policy e⁄ectiveness depends on the intertem-
poral allocation of education costs, which is determined in the public regime
by the tax ratio (1 ￿ x)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿1. Therefore, ￿scal policy may a⁄ect growth
and welfare through two channels: on the one hand, study time can be in-
creased by reducing second-period tax rates; on the other hand, ￿rst-period
tax rates and public spending may increase long-run growth by raising the
accumulation rate. This dichotomy is crucial for results presented in the next
section.
As regards welfare, individual lifetime utility in period t is the sum of




i + (1 + ￿￿)logk
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j; i = A;B: (36)
The static term ￿ depends on initial endowments and work time. The accu-
mulation term varies only in the short run and converges to (1 + ￿￿)logki
ss.
The last term in (36), instead, grows inde￿nitely, implying that individual
7Work time in the public system does not depend on the marginal e⁄ect of expenditures
on learning (coe¢ cient pA depends on ￿, whereas pB does not - see Appendix). This implies
that work time di⁄ers in the two regimes when ￿ = 0.
10welfare exhibits a positive time-trend over generations: for t and t0 large











j + (t ￿ t0)(1 + ￿)log’
i
ss: (37)
Expression (37) shows that the e⁄ects of knowledge transmission dominate,
in terms of welfare levels, the static term ￿ in the long run.
3 Tax policy analysis
This section studies how the relation between taxation and growth is in￿ u-
enced by time-reallocation and crowding-in e⁄ects. The analysis is positive
in spirit, and describes the implications for growth and welfare of alternative
tax policies. A policy is de￿ned as a sequence {￿B
t ;xt;￿t} implemented by
￿scal authorities over the whole time-horizon t = 0;:::;1. Since there are
three policy instruments, it is convenient to restrict the analysis to a subset of
issues related to tax policy, focusing on the growth e⁄ects of alternative ways
to ￿nance public investment. Speci￿cally, we ￿x instrument ￿B by assuming
that the public propensity to spend is maintained at the e¢ cient level, and
study the growth scenarios implied by di⁄erent combinations of tax rates.
This procedure allows us to describe the implications of re-distributing the
burden of education across the individual life-cycle according to di⁄erent cri-
teria. Since any value of ￿ corresponds to a unique feasible level of work
time, ￿B and x are associated to each possible ￿ as follows:
￿
B (￿) = ￿"
















Equation (38) is formally analogous to the optimality condition obtained
for the private propensity and represents the e¢ cient public propensity to
spend (section 3.1 shows that (38) indeed characterises Ramsey-optimal al-
locations). Expression (39) de￿nes the unique value of x consistent with the
budget constraint. The next section describes the Ramsey-optimal policy,
which implies a high tax rate for young individuals. Section 3.2 investigates
the consequences of alternative policies that shift the burden from the ￿rst
to the second period of life.
113.1 Ramsey-optimal policy
The Ramsey-optimal policy is de￿ned according to the standard criterion: a
hypothetical central planner seeks the sequence of consumption levels, work










t (logct + ￿ logdt+1); (40)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the social discount factor, subject to the transition law




t [ht (1 + ‘t)]
1￿￿ ￿ nct ￿ ndt ￿ Etht; (41)
taking initial endowments (h0, K0) as given. The solution of the social prob-
lem determines the Ramsey-optimal allocation, and a Ramsey-optimal policy




t} that implements such an allo-
cation. This requires to set tax rates and the public spending ratio gt ￿ EB
t
in order to satisfy the government budget constraint and the optimality con-
ditions of the centralised problem. Formally, the following relations must

































Equation (42) is the e¢ cient public propensity to spend in education, which
indeed veri￿es (38); equation (43) is the government budget constraint; im-
posing the equality between market factor prices (wB
t , RB
t ) and optimal mar-
ginal productivities yields equation (44).
There is a unique Ramsey-optimal policy compatible with convergence
towards balanced growth, which features constant tax rates. The constant
tax rate ￿
￿ satisfying conditions (42)-(44) is recursively determined by the
8Note that we are not assuming ex-ante that ￿B is kept at an e¢ cient level: in this














￿) and ￿B (￿


















It derives from ￿ > 1 that individuals are taxed more heavily in their ￿rst
period of life: for example, when the learning technology exhibits constant
returns to scale, " + ￿ = 1, Ramsey-optimal taxation implies ￿(￿
￿) = 2.
More generally, with non-increasing returns to scale ("+￿ ￿ 1) the following
results hold.
Proposition 4 Under the Ramsey-optimal policy f￿￿;x￿;￿
￿g, work time is
lower in the public regime, and public propensity to spend in education is










Proposition 4 can be interpreted as follows. In the private regime, indi-
vidual study time and expenditures in education are below Ramsey-optimal
levels, because ￿nitely-lived sel￿sh agents do not fully internalise the bene￿ts
of knowledge transmission. Ramsey-optimal policies cure this market incom-
pleteness by increasing study time and the propensity to spend in education.
However, the associated tax burden falls heavily on young workers (￿ > 1),
whereas adults are generally subsidised.10 High tax rates on young agents,
low work time, and high propensity to spend in education drive down the
long-run saving rate, which is generally higher in the private system:













term in square brackets is strictly positive, implying ￿ > 1.
10It can be shown that ￿
￿ < 0 obtains when ￿￿ < 0:5 in the general case " + ￿ ￿ 1.
Moreover, ￿￿ < 0:5 is not strictly necessary to have ￿
￿ < 0: for example, when " + ￿ = 1
it follows from ￿ = 2 that adults are subsidised whenever x￿ < 0:5, which is always the
case in our simulations.
13Lemma 5 Under the Ramsey-optimal policy f￿￿;x￿;￿
￿g, the accumulation
rate zB is strictly lower than zA if either " + ￿ = 1, or " + ￿ < 1 with a


















If " + ￿ = 1 the term in round-brackets equals unity, and ￿ = 2 implies
zA > zB (￿
￿). If " + ￿ < 1, expression (51) yields zA > zB (￿
￿) provided the
term in round-brackets (below unity) is more than o⁄set by ￿ > 1. These
results imply that Ramsey-optimal policies generally involve crowding-out of
physical capital, which in￿ uences knowledge formation via public spending.
In terms of growth rates, the negative e⁄ect on savings can be o⁄set by the






















where the term in square brackets is always below unity. Whether the whole
expression is below unity depends on the parameters, and simulations suggest
that the relative share ￿ plays a crucial role in this regard. Low values of ￿
tend to reduce the negative impact of crowding-out e⁄ects on ’B
ss (￿
￿) because
the relative importance of K in production is limited. Conversely, high values
of ￿ strengthen crowding-out e⁄ects, and Ramsey-optimal taxation is more
likely to be growth-reducing with respect to a pure private system. For
example, setting " = ￿ = 0:5 and ￿ = 0:8 implies ’A
ss=’B
ss = 0:946 for
￿ = 0:4, whereas setting ￿ = 0:6 ceteris paribus yields ’A
ss=’B
ss = 1:052.
The implications for welfare are as follows. As shown in the previous
section, individual utility levels are crucially determined by the ￿ growth term￿
in the long run. Consequently, the welfare gap between the two regimes,
UA ￿UB, re￿ ects the sign of the growth gap ’A
ss ￿’B
ss once the economy has
approached balanced growth. Figure 1 shows that for ￿ = 0:4, utility UB
under Ramsey-optimal taxation is always higher than UA. When ￿ = 0:6,









and (34) in this expression gives ’A
ss, while substituting ￿￿ = ￿B (￿
￿) and (35) yields ’B
ss.
Taking the ratio and substituting (45) gives (52).
14on the other hand, UB > UA only for a ￿nite number of periods: in this case,
long-run growth rates are such that ’A
ss > ’B
ss (￿
￿), and individuals enjoy
higher utility from the private system in the long run.
3.2 Alternative tax policies
This section studies the e⁄ects of alternative policies that shift the tax burden
from the ￿rst to the second period of life. Firstly, we analyse the properties
of labour-neutral policies: when tax rates are adjusted so that work time is
equal between public and private regimes, economic activity in the public
system is sustained by increased savings through a crowding-in mechanism,
and long-run growth is unambiguously higher than under the private system
regardless of parameter values. This implies that labour-neutral taxation
yields higher growth and long-run welfare than under the Ramsey-optimal
policy when the latter strategy brings intensive crowding-out. Secondly, we
show that there generally exists a set of non-optimal tax rates yielding higher
growth and long-run welfare with respect to the Ramsey policy, even when
the latter strategy is growth-improving with respect to the private regime.
Labour-neutral taxation. Assume that the government implements labour-
neutral taxation, as de￿ned in Proposition 3. Setting ￿t = ￿ ￿ in each period,
equations (38)-(39) de￿ne a constant propensity ￿ ￿ = ￿B ￿￿ ￿
￿
, and a constant
tax rate ￿ x = x
￿￿ ￿
￿
on young generations. The properties of the labour-neutral
policy {￿ ￿; ￿ x;￿ ￿} are summarised in the following
Proposition 6 Under the labour-neutral policy {￿ ￿; ￿ x;￿ ￿}, young generations
are subsidised (￿ x < 0), the accumulation rate is higher in the public regime
(zB > zA), and public education guarantees higher growth and welfare at least
in the long run (’B
ss > ’A
ss).
When labour supply e⁄ects are neutralised by tax policy, public education
guarantees higher growth. The reason is that ￿ x < 0 implies higher disposable
income for young generations, and higher savings: this crowding-in e⁄ect
sustains economic activity by raising the accumulation rate, which in￿ uences
long-run growth through public spending:
z " ) yss " ) ￿yss ￿ g1 ￿ E1 " :






ss; that is, crowding-in e⁄ects yield higher long-run growth with respect
15Figure 1: Time paths of lifetime utility under di⁄erent tax policies with
￿ = 0:8, " = ￿ = 0:5, K0 = 10, h0 = 1: Graph (a) assumes ￿ = 0:4: the
Ramsey-optimal policy improves growth and welfare with respect to both the
private system and the labour-neutral policy (see Figure 3 for details). Graph
(b) assumes ￿ = 0:6: labour-neutral taxation yields higher long-run growth
with respect to both the private system and the Ramsey-optimal policy;





ss = 5:65%, and ’B
ss (￿
￿) = 0:45%.
16to the private system regardless of parameter values. As shown in section
3.1, Ramsey-optimal policies do not have this property, as the sign of the
growth gap ’A
ss ￿ ’B
ss crucially depends on the value of ￿. Consequently,
labour-neutral taxation may yield higher growth and long-run welfare than











￿). Put di⁄erently, high
values of ￿ strengthen not only crowding-out, but also crowding-in e⁄ects, so
that shifting the burden onto adult workers enhances growth when the share
of physical capital in production is relatively high. This is con￿rmed by the
numerical example described in Figure 1: consistent with Proposition 6, the
labour-neutral policy is welfare-improving with respect to the private system
regardless of the values of ￿. When ￿ = 0:4, Ramsey-optimal taxation yields
higher utility levels than labour-neutral taxation, but the opposite result
holds setting ￿ = 0:6: from period t = 9 onwards, labour-neutral taxation
implies higher utility than the Ramsey-optimal policy.
It is important to note that Ramsey-optimal and labour-neutral policies
cannot be Pareto-ranked12. By construction, any policy that shifts the bur-
den of ￿rst-period education onto the second period of life implies an income-
redistribution e⁄ect that brings welfare losses for adult agents in period zero.
This is a typical ￿ ￿rst-father problem￿ : public education of those who are
young in t = 0 must be ￿nanced by a generation which does not receive any
bene￿t from the newly-established school system.13 Bearing this in mind,
the policy implications of Figure 1 are nonetheless interesting: ￿rst, when
crowding-out e⁄ects are important, Ramsey-optimal policies do not preserve
the welfare of all generations with respect to a pure private system, whereas
12Figure 1 compares di⁄erent policies in terms of lifetime utility levels. Alternatively,
one might consider present-value streams of utilities yielded by the same policies, using a
predetermined social discount factor. On the one hand, it is possible to construct ranges
of values for ￿ such that welfare gains from non-Ramsey policies might compensate, in
present-value terms, the loss of intertemporal e¢ ciency over some chosen time interval
(t0;t1), abstracting from the ￿rst-father problem. On the other hand, present-value com-
parisons would not allow assessing the intergenerational distribution of bene￿ts - which is
a major focus of the analysis - since "social welfare" would in this case be thought of as a
discounted sum over generations.
13The time-path of individual welfare depicted in Figure 1 refers to lifetime utility
Ut = U(ct;et+1), so that U0 = U(c0;e1) pertains to those who are young in period zero.
Instead, second-period utility of the ￿rst generation of fathers - i.e. those adult at time
zero - equals ￿ loge0 and is necessarily higher under Ramsey-optimal taxation with respect
to labour-neutral taxation.
17labour-neutral policies always succeed in this regard. Second, knowledge
transmission ampli￿es the e⁄ectiveness of policies that increase disposable
income of savers, with possible gains in terms of growth and long-run welfare
with respect to Ramsey-optimal taxation.
The Growth Curve. The labour-neutral policy described above is a pecu-
liar tax rule which implements the same work time in a public system as in
the private regime. When comparing the e⁄ects of alternative strategies for
￿nancing public education, this tax rule represents a useful device for obtain-
ing analytical results on crowding-in e⁄ects. However, the role of crowding-in
e⁄ects can be assessed in more general terms by considering the whole set of
tax rates that shift the education burden onto adults. That is, crowding-in
e⁄ects may be exploited by policies which are not necessarily labour-neutral,
in order to preserve individual welfare of late-in-time generations. This point
can be addressed by studying the relation between asymptotic growth and
the tax rate on adults. Substituting (38) and (39) in (35), the asymptotic
growth rate can be expressed as














where ￿ is a constant parameter. Expression (53) describes the e⁄ects of
taxation on growth in terms of two factors, the level of study time and the
tax ratio (1 ￿ x(￿))(1 ￿ ￿)
￿1. These terms react in opposite directions as
the tax rate on adults varies: an increase in ￿ implies reduced study time,
but also an increase in the tax ratio.14 Figure 2 shows that the growth curve
(53) has an inverted-U shape, which is explained as follows. From property





= 0. Consequently, the net e⁄ect
of a marginal increase d￿ on long-run growth is positive for low values of
￿, due to the increase in the tax ratio. However, for high values of ￿, the
negative e⁄ect on growth of reduced study time dominates at the margin. It
is worth noting that this relation is a peculiar feature of our model, which
results from the assumption of productive public expenditures.
The inverted-U shape of the growth curve implies that there exists a
unique tax rate ^ ￿ which maximises long-run growth. Since ^ ￿ generally di⁄ers
from the Ramsey-optimal rate ￿
￿, there exists a tax rate ￿
n 6= ￿
￿ yielding
14Equation (39) implies that x(￿) is decreasing in ￿. Therefore, a marginal increase in
￿ increases the tax ratio in (53).
18Figure 2: The growth curve (53) is an inverted-U relation between the as-
ymptotic growth rate and the tax rate on adults. Setting ￿ = 0:4 with the
same parameters of Figure 1, the Ramsey-optimal tax rate is ￿
￿ = ￿21:9%
and the growth-equivalent rate is ￿
n = 14:3%. Any value ￿ 2 (￿
￿;￿
n) is
growth-improving with respect to the Ramsey-optimal policy.
a long-run growth rate equal to that obtained under the Ramsey-optimal
policy (see Figure 2). We will refer to ￿
n as the growth-equivalent tax rate on
adults: using equations (38) and (39), a growth-equivalent policy {￿n;xn;￿
n}
is de￿ned by a tax rate on adults ￿
n 6= ￿
￿, an e¢ cient propensity to spend
in education ￿n = ￿B (￿






￿). The properties of the growth-equivalent policy crucially
depend on whether ￿
￿ < ￿
n:
Proposition 7 When ￿
￿ < ￿
n, the accumulation rate and the output-human
capital ratio are higher under the growth-equivalent policy if either "+￿ = 1,

















19Figure 2 depicts the case considered in Proposition 7: the Ramsey-optimal
tax rate ￿
￿ lies to the left of the growth-maximising rate ^ ￿, implying ￿
￿ <
^ ￿ < ￿
n. A little algebra shows that ￿
￿ < ^ ￿ requires15














Condition (56) is always satis￿ed in our simulations with varying parame-
ters, but analytical proof of its general validity is quite di¢ cult to obtain.
The point is that when (56) is satis￿ed, there exists a continuum of second-
period tax rates that redistribute the burden in favour of young generations
and imply higher growth with respect to the Ramsey-optimal policy. This
continuum is represented by the interval (￿
￿;￿
n), as shown in Figure 2.
This result reinforces our previous conclusions about the importance of
crowding-in e⁄ects: there generally exists a set of growth-improving tax rates
~ ￿ 2 (￿
￿;￿
n) yielding higher long-run growth and welfare with respect to the
Ramsey-optimal policy, and this happens even for relatively low values of ￿.
Figure 3 considers the same parameter values used in Figure 1, with ￿ = 0:4.
The Ramsey-optimal tax rate is ￿
￿ = ￿21:9% and the associated growth-
equivalent tax rate is ￿
n = 14:3%. In this case, labour-neutral taxation is
not growth-improving with respect to the Ramsey-optimal policy (as shown
in Figure 1) because ￿ ￿ = 14:9% > ￿
n. Choosing a growth-improving tax
rate ~ ￿ 2 (￿
￿;￿
n), ￿scal authorities may redistribute the burden in favour of







￿). In the numerical example
of Figure 3 we set ￿ = 4%, which implies higher growth in the long run:
consequently, individual utility levels are above those obtained under the
Ramsey-optimal policy from period t = 8 onwards.
It is worth noting that these results recall the logic of Gale-type inter-
generational transfers. Gale (1973) showed that, for a two-generations pure
exchange economy, the ￿rst generation can raise future welfare by renouncing
part of its claim to the endowments bene￿tting the second generation, which
in turn transmits a claim to its successor, and so on. In the present context,
the income-redistribution e⁄ect amounts to the share of claims on human
capital not received by adults at time zero, and the impact of such policies
15For simplicity, (56) is derived with constant returns to scale " + ￿ = 1. The left-hand
side of (56) is the Ramsey-optimal tax ratio, which equals 1=￿(￿
￿) = 0:5 by (45). The
right-hand side is the growth-maximising tax ratio, where ￿0
￿ is the total derivative of the
tax ratio with respect to ￿, and ‘0
￿ = @‘B
? (￿)=@￿, with ￿0
￿ and ‘0
￿ both evaluated at ￿ = ^ ￿.
20Figure 3: Time paths of lifetime utility under di⁄erent tax policies with
￿ = 0:8, " = ￿ = 0:5, K0 = 10, h0 = 1, and ￿ = 230. Values for the
private system, Ramsey-optimal and labour-neutral policies are the same as
in Figure 1 - graph (a), now compared with the growth-improving policy
~ ￿ = 4%.
on long-run growth and welfare depends on the interplay between physical
capital accumulation, time-reallocation e⁄ects, and knowledge transmission.
From a policymaking perspective, the rationale for such policies would hinge
on the possibility that the government is able to sterilise the welfare loss
for adults at time zero. In this regard, the assumption of a balanced public
budget is crucial, since the ￿rst-father problem arises as long as ￿rst-period
education at time zero must be ￿nanced at time zero. This suggests a pow-
erful role for the use of public debt: for example, the government may run
positive debt at time zero to ￿nance initial spending, and then smooth ser-
vice repayments over time according to a calibrated ￿scal rule. Whether debt
policy rules for intergenerational ￿scal fairness are compatible with socially
optimal growth rates may be an interesting topic for future research.
4 Conclusions
This paper analysed the e⁄ects of alternative tax policies on growth and wel-
fare in a model with knowledge transmission and labour-enhancing public
investment. Fiscal policy a⁄ects growth and welfare through two channels:
the relation between learning and public expenditures, and time-reallocation
21e⁄ects induced by variations in prospective tax rates. These two mecha-
nisms imply an inverted-U relation between long-run growth and second-
period tax rates, so that a generic growth rate can be obtained by means
of opposite ￿nancing strategies: ￿ taxing adults￿or ￿ taxing the young￿ . Un-
der Ramsey-optimal policies, the education burden falls on young workers,
reducing the saving rate and crowding out physical capital. Consequently,
Ramsey-optimal strategies for ￿nancing public education may reduce growth
and long-run welfare with respect to a pure private system, depending on the
relative importance of physical capital in production. Alternative policies
that shift the burden onto adults instead protect the welfare of all genera-
tions. On the one hand, there always exists a labour-neutral policy under
which growth and welfare are unambiguously higher than under the private
system, by virtue of the crowding-in mechanism. On the other hand, there
generally exists a continuum of non-optimal tax rates under which long-run
growth and welfare are higher than with the Ramsey-optimal policy.
More generally, this paper studied how the relation between taxation and
growth is in￿ uenced by the assumption of labour-enhancing educational ex-
penditures: most previous literature emphasised the time-reallocation e⁄ects
induced by distortionary income taxation, using models where crowding-
in mechanisms play a minor role. But crowding-in e⁄ects are important
when educational expenditures a⁄ect learning, because knowledge transmis-
sion ampli￿es the e⁄ectiveness of policies that increase the disposable income
of savers. In particular, if the ￿rst generation renounces part of its claims
on human capital, crowding-in e⁄ects sustain economic growth and welfare
in the long run.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Substituting the ￿rst-order condition
(10) in the accumulation rule (13), the dynamics of ‘A










where qA = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿￿)
￿1, and pA = 1+(1 + ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿￿)
￿1.
This expression is analogous to (25): since qB and pB are constant when
￿t = ￿ in each period, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 can be proved by studying





Taking the limits on the right hand side of (A1) we obtain lim‘t!0 ‘t+1 = ￿p
and lim‘t!1 ‘t+1 = +1, that imply the existence of a stationary solution




q‘t ￿ p, the derivative of the



















implying that the stationary equilibrium ‘? is unique. Setting ‘t+1 = ‘t
in (A1) gives a second-order equation in ‘ with two roots of opposite sign:
since p > 1, the positive root is ‘? as de￿ned by equations (14) and (28).

















hence work time displays unstable dynamics outside the stationary equilib-
rium ‘?. Consequently, work time jumps at the optimal level ‘? in period
zero and is constant thereafter.
Proof of Proposition 3. Since qB and pB depend on the tax rate on
adult generations, optimal work time in the public regime is a function of
￿. To simplify notation, we de￿ne ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿ and study the function ‘B
? (￿).




























￿ = @pB=@￿ > 0 and ￿￿ = @￿=@￿ < 0. We ￿rstly prove that ‘B
?
decreases with ￿. The proof is by contradiction: assume that @‘B
? =@￿ > 0:





















Substituting (A5) and 2‘B
? = ￿ +
q
(￿)







which is absurd because it violates (29). Therefore @‘B
? =@￿ < 0, i.e. ‘B
?
increases with ￿. From (26), (27) and (A2), we have lim￿!0 ‘B
? = 1. Taking
the limit as ￿ ! 1 it can also be shown that lim￿!1 ‘B
? = ‘B
min, which
completes the proof of property (i). Property (ii) derives from property
(i): since ‘B
? decreases monotonically from 1 to ‘B
min as ￿ goes from 0 to
+1, there is a unique intersection ‘B
? = ‘A




min). As regards property (iv), when ￿ = 1 (that is, when
￿ = 0), we have qA ￿ qB = q, and optimal work time in the two economies
di⁄ers only because pA > pB: if @‘i

















? when ￿ = 0. Property (iii) is a corollary: since @‘B
? =@￿ > 0, a
strictly positive value ￿ = ￿ ￿ is required to obtain ‘B
? = ‘A
? .
Ramsey-optimal policy. The Ramsey problem is to maximise (40)






t (logct + ￿ logdt+1) + ￿
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t are multipliers attached to human and physical capital



















































t indicate optimal marginal productivities. From (A8) and





t (1 ￿ ￿)yt
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1 + ‘t ￿
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Setting (A11) one period later and substituting (A12) gives condition (44)
in the text.
Proof of Proposition 4. Substituting (48) in (45) gives
￿
￿ =





We prove inequality (49) by showing that ￿
￿ < ￿ ￿. The proof is by contradic-
tion: supposing ￿









and, since ￿ ￿ > 0, also ￿






￿￿ + "(￿ ￿ 1)
(A15)
25Combining (A13) with (A15) and substituting ‘A
min by (15) gives
1 + ￿￿
1 + ￿" + ￿￿
<
￿￿
￿￿ + "(￿ ￿ 1)
;
which reduces to
￿ < 1 + ￿￿: (A16)





1 ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ "
; (A17)
which is absurd because " > "￿￿ implies that the right-hand side of (A17)
is greater than unity. This proves that ￿




This in turn implies ￿￿ > ￿A by virtue of equations (16) and (38).
Individual welfare. Substituting consumers￿￿rst-order conditions re-








￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 + ￿
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t (1 ￿ ")
1 + ￿‘
￿
(1 ￿ x); (A19)














t+1; i = A;B: (A20)
Setting Ki
t+1=Y i




Using this result and substituting (A18)-(A19)-(A20) in (7), lifetime utility






















where the last term derives from Yt+1 = K￿
t+1H
1￿￿




t+1 ￿ log ~ zi in (A21) yields
U
i






+ ￿ log￿￿ + (1 + ￿￿)logk
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j: substituting this expression in (A22) gives
eq.(36) in the text, where static terms equal
￿
A = ￿ log￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + log
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ‘A
? (1 ￿ " ￿ ￿)
‘A








B = ￿ log￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + log
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ")‘B
?
‘B












= ‘?, and, by
(16) and (38), ￿A = ￿B ￿￿ ￿
￿
= ￿ ￿. From (18) and (31), we obtain
zA
zB =
‘? (1 + ￿￿ + ￿") ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿
[‘? (1 + ￿") ￿ 1](1 ￿ ￿ x)
: (A23)
Substituting (34) and (35) in the left-hand side of (A23) gives
￿ ￿ = ￿￿ (1 ￿ ‘?)[‘? (1 + ￿") ￿ 1]
￿1 > 0: (A24)
We now prove that ￿ x < 0. From (39), ￿ x‘? = (1 ￿ ‘?)
￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿: substituting
(A24) in this expression implies that ￿ x > 0 only if
‘? (1 + ￿") > 1 + ￿"; (A25)
which is absurd since ‘? < 1. Therefore, young generations are subsidised.





ss. Consequently, school quality is asymptotically
higher in the public regime (￿ ￿yB
ss > ￿ ￿yA























least in the long run.
Proof of Proposition 7. Substituting (38) in (35) and taking the ratio



























n, the term in square brackets in (A27) is always greater than
unity because the tax ratio increases with ￿. If " + ￿ = 1 the ￿rst term
reduces to 1, implying zB (￿
n) > zB (￿
￿). If " + ￿ < 1, the whole expression




n) is su¢ ciently low.




￿) in the respective cases, because
yB
ss is an increasing function of zB by (32).
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